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U. S. CONCEPT OF GUERRILLA WARFARESUMMARY

1. From the United States point of view, guerrilla warfare is essentially a military operation, supported as necessary by the United States and conducted primarily by indigenous groups behind enemy lines. Guerrillas are largely self-sufficient but require some outside support in order to be most effective. However, in some instances, it may be necessary to provide extensive support. Guerrillas support conventional military operations generally by attacking enemy lines of communications and other strategic targets and by diverting the enemy forces from the principal battle zone.
2. The U. S. decision to support or not support a particular guerrilla force should be based on military necessity giving due consideration to the political orientation and aspiration of the group and the U. S. capability to provide logistical support.
3. U. S. will attempt to generate guerrilla forces where potential and need exists, as well as to establish contact with guerrilla forces generated by other means and will exert maximum control over any U. S.-supported guerrilla force. In extreme cases it may support guerrillas over whom little influence can be exercised if such forces materially contribute to the U. S. effort.
4. Guerrillas can play a key role during any phase of a war, but especially in assisting the retardation of an enemy offensive or in supporting a friendly offensive. For most effective guerrilla operations in the early phases of war, peacetime preparations must be made to include the development of indigenous assets.
5. Although the creation of effective guerrilla assets in peacetime is often difficult, particularly in denied areas, every effort will be made to develop them. The disturbed or even chaotic conditions immediately preceding and following the outbreak of hostilities may be a major factor in producing potential recruits.

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6. In peacetime the United States, either unilaterally or in collaboration with friendly governments, will, when authorized by the appropriate national authority, establish guerrilla cadres, nuclei, or agent-organizers in areas now under enemy control or likely to be overrun in the event of war, or will recruit, train, and hold such personnel outside the area of use. In addition, the U. S. will, when authorized by the appropriate national authority, stockpile material, establish operational bases, train operational teams, and prepare operational plans. On or after D-Day, the guerrilla cadres and nuclei will be activated, contact will be established with other guerrilla potentials and attempts will be made to generate additional groups. U. S. operational teams will be introduced to guerrilla groups or to areas where guerrilla potential exists and preferably where U. S. agents have previously established contact or at least reconnoitered the ground. Such teams will organize, train, equip and exploit guerrillas in support of conventional military operations and will, through communications with base, arrange for appropriate logistical, tactical, technical intelligence and psychological support. Additional specialist personnel may be introduced to assist the guerrilla force in carrying out such support operations and to coordinate such operations with independent U. S. activities in similar fields.

7. After liberation, guerrillas may be used as police, security troops, or conventional forces, or arrangements will be made, preferably through indigenous authorities, to pay, decorate, thank, and demobilize them. Timely consideration must be given to the demobilization and disarming of guerrilla forces in order to obviate dissident groups within them from caching arms for possible future action or use against political groups favorable to the U. S.

I. BASIC PRINCIPLES

A. Scope

1. This paper is intended to outline the U. S. concept of guerrilla warfare when sponsored and waged in support of U. S. and allied conventional military operations.

2. The principles set forth in this paper apply specifically to unilateral U. S. guerrilla warfare activities but may be modified as

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required so as to apply to U. S. participation in combined guerrilla warfare enterprises with Allied Governments when authorized by the appropriate national authority.

3. This document does not attempt to allocate responsibilities to U. S. Government departments or agencies in the implementation of this concept.

B. Definitions

1. Guerrillas - Highly maneuverable, lightly armed, predominantly indigenous forces which are organized on a military or para-military basis and which are based on and operating in enemy territory.

2. Guerrilla Warfare

a. Guerrilla warfare is comprised of operations conducted by guerrillas and consists principally of raids, ambushes, harassment tactics, demolition, and other disruptive operations. It normally involves short, sharp, surprise encounters, followed by quick withdrawal; it rarely involves sustained defensive maneuvers or direct attack on deployed enemy combat units, except in direct support of friendly conventional forces.

b. The field of guerrilla warfare includes not only the tactical operations conducted by guerrillas, but all the activities, both overt and covert, connected with the generation, support, organization, administration, and demobilization of guerrilla forces. Certain subsidiary activities in which guerrillas may participate are psychological warfare, intelligence activities, evasion and escape and subversion.

c. Guerrillas should be distinguished from:

(1) Commandos, who sometimes operate behind enemy lines and often employ guerrilla tactics, but base themselves in friendly territory.

(2) Underground resistance forces, some of whom may conduct operations very similar to guerrilla operations, but who live under cover inside the enemy control system.

(3) Special Mission teams who may employ guerrilla techniques but who operate on a specific mission basis and are normally based behind friendly lines.

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3. Clandestine Operations Operations conducted in such a manner as to conceal the true nature of the activity itself or to conceal the mission and sponsor of the persons engaged in it; applies principally to intelligence and "underground" resistance activity. Guerrilla operations themselves are not considered clandestine, but a guerrilla force may have clandestine auxiliary units engaged in resistance, intelligence, or support activities. In addition, a guerrilla nucleus or cadre may be clandestinely generated and may remain clandestine for some time prior to its activation.

4. Agent Any person engaged in clandestine operations in behalf of and under the direction of a government service, military service, or resistance organization.

5. Operational Teams The term "operational teams" as employed in this paper refers to selected teams of U. S. or mixed teams of U. S. and indigenous personnel infiltrated into enemy rear areas for the purpose of prosecuting guerrilla warfare in support of U. S. plans.

C. United States Interest

The United States interest in guerrilla warfare is primarily that of a sponsor and will be primarily military. The United States is concerned with the generation, organization, training, support, control, and employment of guerrilla forces in support of conventional military operations.

D. Decision to Prosecute Guerrilla Warfare:

1. The relationship between guerrillas and a sponsoring power is based generally upon the defeat of a common enemy and the establishment of a satisfactory political system.

2. The decision to prosecute guerrilla warfare in a given area will primarily depend upon military necessity and the overall value of such a movement as an adjunct to military operations in respect to the prosecution of war against a hostile state. However, political considerations will also generally exercise an important influence in the selection of the specific guerrilla elements or resistance groups which are to receive support. Other factors to be given consideration:

- a. Guerrilla potential in a given area.
- b. Extent of logistical support required in terms of anticipated guerrilla yield.
- c. The degree to which effective U. S. control and exploitation can be assured.
- d. The proximity (time-wise) to liberation of a given area by U. S. troops.

E. Support of Guerrillas

The number of guerrillas raised within a given area should be in consonance with the operational requirement for such forces and the ability to support the forces locally or from external sources. Due to the inherent difficulties of external support of guerrilla warfare, maximum effort will be made to obtain support for guerrillas from local sources so as to reduce U. S. support to the minimum required for effective operations. The degree of support required will vary according to the local situation. Support for guerrilla warfare may encompass not only types of support necessary for conventional forces but may also require special items and devices; financial support, means for land, sea and air infiltration; specially trained personnel; technical support; intelligence support, and psychological warfare and tactical fire support.

F. Guerrilla Support to Friendly Conventional Forces

1. The support which guerrilla forces can render to friendly conventional forces will be influenced by many factors but generally guerrillas will conduct raids, ambushes, demolitions, feints, diversionary attacks and other offensive actions against the enemy. These actions will:

- a. Reduce enemy combat effectiveness by delaying enemy movements.
- b. Disrupt enemy lines of communication.
- c. Cause the enemy to canalize his LOC's by harassing alternate or secondary routes.
- d. Disorganize enemy command and communication systems.
- e. Lower morale of enemy troops.
- f. Divert enemy forces from combat operations to security operations.

2. Guerrillas can provide tactical and strategic intelligence acquired in support of their own operations.

3. Guerrillas can provide assistance to downed air-crew members and other friendly personnel evading or escaping from the enemy.

4. Guerrillas can provide safe areas and bases from which appropriate U. S. specialists or the guerrillas themselves can:

- a. Conduct intelligence activities.
- b. Conduct special operations.
- c. Wage psychological warfare.
- d. Select and mark targets and assess target damage.

II. The Mission of Guerrilla Warfare

A. Mission To conduct planned guerrilla warfare as an integral part of the overall scheme of military maneuver within a theater of war organized and conducted to meet military requirements.

B. Tasks

1. To retard enemy offensive action through systematic interdiction of enemy LOC's in concert with overall military plans.
2. To conduct a continuous series of offensive actions in selected areas of the enemy's rear designed to:
 - a. Cause the enemy to deploy front-line troops to rear area defense.
 - b. Impair the enemy's build-up to an offensive or to a defensive capability by attacks on his LOC's and supply installations.
 - c. To weaken enemy control over the civilian population.
3. To intensify interdiction of enemy LOC's and to conduct other offensive actions in support of a friendly offense.

C. Discussion:

1. In war a critical need for guerrilla support in the retardation of an enemy advance will exist at the outset of hostilities. Hence, preparations for the early employment of guerrilla forces in support of conventional military operations should be planned prior to the commencement of hostilities. Although it is difficult to create a standing guerrilla force in potentially hostile territory during peacetime, the nuclei of such forces should be organized and prepared for expansion upon the outbreak of hostilities, or at such other time as may be deemed most effective. In the conversion of indigenous assets to guerrilla warfare activities, cognizance should be taken of other unconventional warfare objectives.

C. Discussion: (Cont'd)

2. Following retardation of the initial enemy offensive it is not unreasonable to assume that the guerrilla recruitment potential will be increased as a result of enemy set-backs. During this period, guerrillas will be concerned not only with current operations but also preparation for support of a friendly advance.

3. Atomic warfare will probably increase the significance of guerrilla activity in the future. The disruptive effect of attack with strategic weapons will reduce the effectiveness of the enemy's security system, and should open up areas to guerrilla operations in terrain which is normally unsuitable for irregular forces. Furthermore, the dispersion of enemy forces to reduce their vulnerability to tactical and strategic atomic weapons will create advantageous conditions for harassment by guerrilla troops. And finally, actual or threatened attack on strategic targets may increase the guerrilla manpower potential through augmenting the number of the homeless and those seeking refuge in rural areas. In the event of attack with high-yield weapons, guerrillas may act as advance elements of an occupying force if U. S. or Allied ground forces are not immediately available to exploit the resulting military and political vacuum.

III. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

A. General Guerrilla warfare operations may be divided into two broad phases, the preparatory phase, and the exploitation phase. The first phase, the preparatory phase, may take place in peacetime or following the outbreak of active hostilities. The second phase, the exploitation phase, normally occurs during wartime and generally is preceded by a preparatory phase, though in certain operations the exploitation phase may be launched without an elaborate or time consuming preparatory phase.

B. Preparatory Phase

1. Peacetime

a. Preparatory operations in peacetime are directed against two general areas in which a requirement for guerrilla support will exist. These areas may be divided into:

- (1) Areas controlled by the enemy.
- (2) Friendly areas outside of enemy control but which will in all likelihood be over-run in the event of war.

b. In areas within the enemy orbit where a requirement for guerrilla support exists and a guerrilla potential is available, the U. S. will attempt to organize nuclei or cadres capable of developing guerrilla organizations. Failing this, the U. S. will attempt to establish agent personnel capable of reporting the existence and status of any guerrilla potential and of establishing contact with existing guerrillas, providing landing areas, reception parties, and safe haven for U. S. operational teams introduced into the area.

c. Further the U. S. will:

(1) Recruit, train, and hold in readiness both agents and operational teams capable of infiltration after D-Day to develop, organize and conduct guerrilla warfare.

(2) Establish operational bases from which to support and communicate with guerrilla forces.

(3) Stockpile supplies, material, and equipment necessary to prosecute guerrilla warfare.

d. In areas presently friendly to the U. S. and outside the enemy orbit which in all probability will be occupied by enemy forces in wartime and in which both a requirement for guerrilla warfare and a guerrilla potential exists, the U. S. will: Through the medium of accord and liaison with the foreign power in question assist in establishing the capability to conduct guerrilla warfare against a common enemy. In such areas where official sanction for such plans is impractical, the U. S. will, by covert means, attempt to establish the necessary capabilities to conduct guerrilla warfare in time of war.

2. Wartime

a. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the U. S. will prepare agents and teams of operational personnel to be introduced into enemy areas of significant interest to establish contact with guerrilla bands and to organize dissident elements into guerrilla forces. Under normal conditions, agent personnel will establish initial contact with guerrilla elements and prepare for the subsequent infiltration of operational teams. However, in areas where no satisfactory contacts have been made and in which guerrilla support is desired, operational teams may be dropped to establish their own contacts.

C. Exploitation (Operational Phase)

1. The exploitation or operational phase of guerrilla warfare will commence on D-Day or as soon thereafter as possible.
2. The U. S. will introduce operational teams into enemy rear areas to generate and exploit guerrilla forces in support of military plans.
 - a. Operational teams may be infiltrated into areas already organized by previously infiltrated agent organizers.
 - b. Operational teams may be infiltrated without prior agent contact into enemy areas to organize guerrilla elements.
 - c. Operational teams may themselves conduct operations as required in order to accomplish their mission.

D. Discussion During the exploitation or operational phase of guerrilla warfare, tactical operations are conducted openly against the enemy and are characterized by series of offensive actions. However, the operational phase is also one of substantial covert activity, particularly in the field of support activities, psychological warfare, sabotage, escape and evasion, and underground resistance outside guerrilla areas and of clandestine intelligence activity. Guerrilla warfare must generally rely on clandestine support for continued and effective operations, and guerrilla forces will normally develop their own capabilities in regard to local civilian support relating to early warning, intelligence, supply, services, recruits, and moral support.

IV U. S. CONTROL

U. S. control and support of guerrillas will be maintained at two levels, i.e., at the BASE level and at the FIELD level.

A. Base Activities

The U. S. operational base behind friendly lines will:

1. Keep the theater commander informed of the capabilities and activities of guerrilla forces.
2. Make plans for the utilization of the guerrilla force, on the basis of missions assigned by the theater commander, and communicate with the guerrilla force to undertake specific tasks.
3. Determine the types and amounts of support to be provided to the guerrilla force and to arrange for the delivery of such support.

4. Provide for the introduction of personnel.
5. Maintain communication with guerrilla forces.

B. Field Level

1. U. S. operational teams will:
 - a. Exercise the maximum control and leadership over guerrilla forces.
 - b. Maintain communication with the operational base.
 - c. Recommend to base the logistical, tactical, technical, intelligence, and psychological support which should be provided to guerrilla forces.
2. The U. S. may provide specialist personnel to assist the operational teams in advising and controlling in intelligence, psychological warfare, evasion and escape, underground resistance, and other activities and to coordinate such operations with concurrent activities of this nature conducted independently by the U. S. in the area concerned.

V POST OPERATIONAL

A. General

1. After link-up with conventional forces guerrillas may:
 - a. Become regular troops to carry out conventional military operations.
 - b. Conduct police security or counter-guerrilla actions.
 - c. Be demobilized.
2. Care must be exercised to assure that guerrillas do not continue to wage civil war after link-up with conventional forces or to set themselves up as a political force in opposition to the legitimate indigenous government or to U. S./Allied military governments.

B. U. S. Action

1. During the operational phase plans should be laid for the ultimate disposition of each group.
2. Guerrillas who are to be used as regular troops will usually need to be reorganized, retrained, re-equipped, and provided suitable command and support.
3. Guerrillas who are to be used for security duties may similarly need to be reorganized, retrained, re-equipped, etc., unless they can be turned over to a civilian authority.

4. Upon demobilization the U. S. must make arrangements to reimburse, indemnify, decorate, thank, and otherwise discharge U. S. responsibility incurred with respect to discharged guerrillas. It is desirable that the responsibility for pay and settlement of any claim arising out of guerrilla operations in support of the U. S./ Allied effort be made the responsibility of the local indigenous government.

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SECRET

AREA OR COUNTRY(S)	ORGANIZATION	FUNCTIONS & TOPICS	PERSONALITIES	DOCUMENT
HQ	PM	G/W		DATE: undated
		PM		
		War Plans		
		U/W		
				CLASS.: S
IDENTIFICATION OF DOCUMENT (author, form, addressee, title & length)				NO.:
Staff Study entitled: U.S. Concept of Guerrilla Warfare.				
11 pages.				LOCATION: HS/CSG- 1514 ✓

ABSTRACT

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